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Thucydides the Athenian set out to make a record of the 
struggle between his people and the Pelopennesians that would 
be a possession for all time.3 In order to do so he resisted (at 
least he said he resisted) the temptation to seek the applause of 
the moment.4 Something worked. Twenty-four centuries later 
people are still fascinated by that war, in which the most famous 
democracy in history was at last utterly defeated, and Thucy-
dides is their primary guide. So far, so good. 
Anyone in the year 4400 who wants to learn about the crea-
tion of another democracy with great pretensions-this one pro-
claiming itself a new order for the ages-will want David Cur-
rie's book. Having read every constitutional case decided by the 
Supreme Court in its first two centuries of operation and written 
two wonderful books about them, Currie realized that he had 
been dealing with an institutional latecomer.5 Although the 
Court is today generally regarded as the leading expositor of the 
Constitution, for decades its role was secondary. As of 1840, for 
example, far more constitutional questions had been debated 
and resolved in Congress than in the Supreme Court. Moreover, 
the issues resolved in Congress were probably more fundamen-
tal. 
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Knowing that the formative years are formative, Currie has 
devoted a volume to the first six Congresses-those that sat 
during what is commonly known as the Federalist period. That 
period came to an end with the Revolution of 1800 and Currie's 
account of the Sixth Congress concludes with a quotation from 
Jefferson's first inaugural address. (p. 295) 
Section I of this review describes briefly The Constitution In 
Congress:· The Federalist Period. Section II then tries to make 
use of Currie's work to consider one of the recurring issues in 
the debate over the usefulness of judicial review: just how likely 
is Congress to come right out and violate the Constitution? 
I. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 
Readers of Currie's studies of the Constitution in the Su-
preme Court will find this book familiar. It is arranged chrono-
logically and for each Congress identifies the most important 
questions of constitutional construction that the legislature was 
called on to address. Currie presents the different positions, the 
arguments that were made for and against them, and Congress' 
ultimate resolution of the issue. He adds his own substantive 
comments, citations to the main primary sources from the time 
that bear on the issue, and frequent prolepses to later times in 
which the country (including the Court) has seen the question 
again. 
Such repeat readers will also find The Constitution In Con-
gress: The Federalist Period familiarly instructive. Currie's laser-
like legal analysis, complete mastery of constitutional practice 
and case law, and grasp of the legal landscape at the time of the 
framing make him the perfect author of this book. A great his-
torian with a good knowledge of law would have written some-
thing different; Currie is great lawyer with a good knowledge of 
history. 
To give the reader a flavor of the book's coverage I will tick 
off some examples of the issues that Currie discusses and then 
recount in a little more detail his treatment of two now-obscure 
debates that raised important constitutional questions. As was 
inevitable, the First Congress addressed a series of fundamental 
problems. Perhaps most thoroughly canvassed in the years since 
is its action concerning the power of the President to remove 
heads of department. After much to-ing and fro-ing, Congress 
adopted legislation that recognized a presidential removal power 
but did not purport to create one. (pp. 36-41) Courts and com-
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mentators have subsequently been through this issue in painful 
detail, without adding much to the debate. 
Presidential removal power was only one of the many points 
of government structure that the Constitution did not address 
specifically. Of similar importance was the federal courts' juris-
diction. Currie is hampered here by the fact that the Judiciary 
Act originated in the Senate, which debated in closed session in 
those days and kept no official record of itss debates, but he 
finds illuminating things to say. (pp. 47-34) Then there was a 
raft of other matters, some quite important, some minor. Many 
had to do with Congress itself, including contested elections, (pp. 
17-19) the apportionment of seats in the House, (pp. 128-135) 
the House's appropriation power when the President made a 
treaty that called for spending money, (pp. 211-217) congres-
sional authority to investigate the executive branch, (pp. 163-
164) and whether Senators and Representatives were subject to 
impeachment and removal, rather than just expulsion by one 
house. (pp. 275-281) 
A constitution's most important structural rules are those 
that identify the persons entitled to exercise power, because 
those are the rules that must be applied without the guidance of 
people who hold power. Currie recounts the Sixth Congress' 
treatment of the momentous question of disputed presidential 
elections. Only once has there been a serious question as to the 
electoral votes, but the possibility that it could happen was in 
1800 and remains today a nightmare, as the events of 1876-1877 
demonstrate it should be. Without a President the machine 
comes to a halt. The Constitution's procedures for making laws 
and treaties and for appointing to principal offices assume that 
there is a President or someone authorized to exercise the pow-
ers and duties of the office.6 The Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to deal with vacancies in the presidency created by re-
moval, death, resignation, or inability to perform, Art. II, sec. 1, 
para. 6, but not vacancies caused by a failure to elect. (p. 294 
n.474) As for the provision under which the House of Represen-
tatives elects a President if none receives a majority of the elec-
toral votes (Art. II, § 1, para. 3 in 1799, today the Twelfth 
Amendment), it does not kick in until the House has been in-
formed of the electors' action. A dispute about who the electors 
are, or who they voted for, could entail a dispute as to whether 
the choice had devolved upon the House. 
6. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 7 (law making); Art. II,§ 2, para. 2 (appointment). 
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In 1800, apparently anticipating a possible dispute over the 
selection of presidential electors, Senator James Ross of Penn-
sylvania asked that a committee be appointed to consider the 
problem.7 (p. 288) Despite objections that Congress had no 
power to act on the issue, a committee was appointed and re-
ported a bill under which a "Grand Committee" drawn from 
both Houses of Congress would resolve disputes over the elec-
tion of electors. (pp. 288-289) Although both Houses passed 
versions of the bill, they were unable to reach an agreement and 
nothing was presented to President Adams. (p. 289) 
The debates, as Currie summarizes them, are constitutional 
reasoning in a nutshell. Does Congress have any power to leg-
islate in this area at all? One might think yes, because it is nec-
essary and proper to the execution of the President's powers that 
there be a President. As is so often the case with the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, however, one easily can draw a contrary in-
ference from the fact that Congress' powers with respect to 
presidential elections are dealt with specifically and are quite 
narrow: Congress can determine when electors are chosen and 
when they vote but it cannot control the place or manner of their 
selection as it can with respect to Representatives and Senators.8 
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Moreover, as Currie points 
out and as participants in the debates argued, one can readily 
find in the Constitution a purpose of minimizing congressional 
involvement in selecting the President. If anything is clear from 
the text and the records of the Federal Convention, it is that as a 
general matter Congress is not supposed to choose the President. 
(pp. 290-291) 
Currie sides with those who argued that it was up to the 
States to provide mechanisms to resolve disputes as to their elec-
toral votes. (p. 291) That is where the current statutes come 
down too, 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15, and it is some relief-as long as the 
States make such provision, and we know who their legitimate 
governments are.9 
7. Currie recounts the story according to which Ross was afraid that the Pennsyl-
vania legislature would deadlock and the State's Republican (that is, Jeffersonian) Gov-
ernor would appoint a slate of electors. (p. 288 n.434) 
8. Compare U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4, para. 1 (power over time, place, and manner 
of choosing Representatives and Senators), with Art. II, § 1., para. 4 (power to determine 
time for choosing electors and day on which they vote, which must be the same through-
out the country). 
9. Sometimes, of course, it may be tricky to tell who is the government of a State. 
See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
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After separation of powers the great category in American 
constitutional law is federalism. I was mildly surprised to learn 
that one of the central questions of federalism, Congress' power 
to regulate and direct the States as such, came up fairly rarely. 
Perhaps the early Congresses had quickly internalized the fun-
damental switch from the Articles of Confederation, under 
which Congress acted on the States, to the Constitution, under 
which it acts primarily on individuals directly. The issue did 
arise from time to time, (e.g., pp. 228-229) and while Congress 
did not seek systematically to direct the States or conscript them 
to carry out federal law, it did impose administrative and minis-
terial duties on state officers. (e.g., pp. 65-66 n. 81, 87) 
Congress does more than structure the government, of 
course. It passes substantive laws. It is an axiom of the Consti-
tution that whatever Congress does must be affirmatively 
authorized; this is a system of enumerated power. Hence the 
question repeatedly arose whether some proposed legislation 
was within a constitutional grant, and Currie discusses various 
appearances of that issue. Indeed, that is probably the issue he 
discusses most often. (I have not actually counted.) 
Likely the most famous enumerated-powers questions from 
this period are two big-ticket items: the First Congress' legisla-
tion authorizing the Bank of the United States (pp. 18-80) and 
the Sixth Congress' Alien and Sedition Acts. (pp. 253-262) 
They are hardly alone, however, and I will discuss in a little more 
detail a lesser known dispute that was another nutshell for con-
stitutional argument. 
Codfish got Congress tangled up in a constitutional net. 
(pp. 168-169) New England's cod fisheries, said the Massachu-
setts legislature, needed help. They were victims of discrimina-
tory tariffs and subsidies for their competitors. (Some things do 
not change.) Secretary of State Jefferson proposed retaliatory 
regulations and duties, but that approach would entail foreign 
policy costs. What else might Congress do? 
Today we would find the answer obvious: Congress could 
give money to the codfishers, assuming it could come up with 
some reason why aiding them would further the common de-
fense or general welfare. 10 But that was not at all obvious then, 
and was indeed the subject of heated debate. When Representa-
tive Barnwell of South Carolina anticipated contemporary doc-
10. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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trine by urging that Congress could tax and spend for any pur-
pose that would advance the general welfare, (pp. 168-169) Rep-
resentative Madison of Virginia jumped all over him, denying 
the existence of any such power. (p. 169) Madison, however, 
then proposed a sophistry that would enable the codfish lobby to 
get what it wanted. While Congress could not simply give the 
codfishers money, it could rebate to them the duties on imported 
salt used to cure their catch. (p. 169) As Currie notes, (p. 169) 
that somewhat undercut Madison's position. If the purposes for 
which Congress may spend are limited, but neither the purposes 
for which it may tax nor the purposes for which it may rebate a 
tax are limited, a lot of spending for the general welfare is going 
to be possible. Maybe Madison just wanted to ensure that the 
codfish steamroller did not set an especially dangerous prece-
dent by actually using the word "bounty." 11 
Currie engages in a fair bit of editorializing, but identifies it 
as such. At no point did it seem to me that he was spinning the 
presentation in a way favorable to his own conclusion, and the 
issues he deals with include several with which I am independ-
ently familiar. I identified only one substantive mistake in the 
book, and it was about what happened in the 1990s, not the 
1790s. As Currie explains, Congress in 1789 sent a package of 
twelve proposed constitutional amendments to the States. (pp. 
110-115) The third through twelfth proposals were quickly 
adopted and became known as the Bill of Rights. The second of 
those twelve had a more interesting history, eventually being 
ratified by three-fourths of the States in 1992. Whether that long 
drawn out process was in keeping with Article V is a subject of 
much debate. Currie appears to believe that the so-called 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment is an imposter. (p. 111 n.437) He 
is especially annoyed that "Congress cravenly passed a resolu-
tion declaring it the law of the land." (Id.) Congress did not do 
that. The Senate passed a resolution so declaring and the House 
passed a similar resolution, but the two were not identical and 
neither body ever voted on the other's version. 12 Congress, 
which as David Currie knows better than most of us is a bicam-
eral body, did nothing. Blame for cowardice, or praise for devo-
11. I was disappointed to find that despite their importance to constitutional history 
our piscine friends of the cod persuasion do not have their own entry in the index. (p. 
317) 
12. CompareS. Con. Res. 120, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), with H. Con. Res. 320, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the Article V process 
are discussed in detail in Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The 
Constitutional Lesson of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L. J. 677 (1993). 
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tion to duty, should go to the Archivist of the United States, who 
as Currie correctly notes (id.) proclaimed the amendment rati-
fied.13 
II. NO WRONG ANSWERS 
Why might one think that judicial review of acts of Congress 
is a good idea? The answer must be that the courts are likely to 
correct congressional misinterpretations and violations of the 
Constitution at an acceptable cost. That in turn requires the 
conclusion that the courts are substantially more likely than 
Congress to be right about the Constitution. That is not obvi-
ously true. Currie reports that the members of the First Con-
gress, although of course often influenced by their views about 
desirable policy, performed their function of constitutional in-
terpretation "both capably and conscientiously." (p. 122) That 
is about all one can hope for from a court, and more than one 
sometimes gets. 
One way to distract attention from this difficult comparison 
is to convene the parade of horribles, describing the ways in 
which Congress might blatantly violate the Constitution and si-
lently assuming that of course a court would never do that. That 
is the rhetoric of Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall had a very 
nice question before him in that case. It is not clear whether 
Congress may add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. I tend to agree with Marshall but many do not. The 
Chief Justice, however, did not discuss such situations in ex-
plaining that the Constitution provided for judicial review and 
(as David Currie elsewhere points out) making the reader want 
to agree with him. 14 Instead, Marshall postulated a statute that 
virtually had the words "This Is An Ex Post Facto Law" written 
on top of it. 15 He obscured the comparative question that so be-
devils sophisticated normative advocates of judicial review by 
discussing cases in which anyone but a liar or a fool would agree 
as to what the Constitution requires. 
13. The section on the Bill of Rights also contains a proofreading error. The text 
indicates (p. 114) that there is a footnote 4457. Currie's documentation is ample, but not 
that ample. It should be 457. 
14. See Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court at 71 (cited in note 5). 
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). According to Marshall, 
a reading of the Constitution denying judicial review "would declare, that if the legisla-
ture shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibi-
tion, is in reality effectual." Id. at 178. 
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It is easy to see why Chief Justice Marshall used the exam-
ples he did. If Congress really were to pass an actual bill of at-
tainder, a statute directing that a named individual should be 
executed forthwith, most people would agree that it was uncon-
stitutional and that something should be done about it. If one 
also went along with the suppressed premise that the courts were 
likely to do something about it, because they somehow were 
immune from whatever had driven Congress to such extremes, 
one might indeed think that judicial review was a good idea un-
der those circumstances. And having come in for a penny one 
might be in for a pound, agreeing that the courts should decide 
dicey questions too, like Congress' authority to add to the Su-
preme Court's original jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, if one thought that Congress was very, 
very unlikely to adopt an actual bill of attainder one might well 
think that taking precautions against that eventuality was not 
worth much trouble. If the trouble included the costs of judicial 
review, through which indirectly selected and largely unaccount-
able lawyers resolve ostensibly legal questions on the basis of 
their substantive views, one might stop worrying what to do 
about the pathological situation. 
At this point The Constitution In Congress: The Federalist 
Period enters with some evidence from real life. The Congresses 
Currie discusses did not enact any clearly unconstitutional stat-
utes or take any other clearly unconstitutional action. None of 
their decisions, such as the provision reflecting presidential re-
moval power, rested on a clearly incorrect reading of the Consti-
tution. While one can agree or disagree with their resolution of 
the many knotty problems they faced, one cannot point to an in-
stance in which they reached a conclusion that no reasonable 
person could agree was consistent with the Constitution. No 
bills of attainder passed. 
Before concluding that this evidence weakens the case for 
judicial review insofar as that case is based on a concern that 
Congress might pass blatantly unconstitutional laws I need to 
deal with several natural objections. The first is that the Sixth 
Congress, at least, did openly violate the Constitution when it 
passed the Alien Act and the Sedition Act. 
Much as we might like to believe otherwise, the constitu-
tionality of the Sedition Act was at worst a close question. It was 
not a plain departure from the principle of enumerated federal 
power. Protecting the President and Congress from false and 
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malicious criticism is much like protecting them from assassina-
tion, and is well calculated to enable them to do their jobs; it 
thus carries their powers into execution. Nor does criminalizing 
libel of federal officers and institutions make much of an inroad 
into the legislative sphere normally occupied by the States, pre-
cisely because it is about criticism of federal officers and institu-
tions. The States remained in charge of protecting their own of-
ficers and their own citizens from calumny. Nor was the Sedition 
Act a plain violation of the First Amendment. It did not impose 
a prior restraint, and it incorporated the principal American 
modifications of the common law of seditious libel: the defense 
of truth and jury determination of fact and law. (p. 261 n.198) 
Its opponents may have been right on the constitutional ques-
tion, but they were not obviously right. 
The Alien Act seems to me a closer call. As Currie ex-
plains, its most troublesome component was Section 9, which 
authorized the President to expel from the country any alien 
whom he found dangerous to the peace and safety of the United 
States or whom he had reasonable grounds to suspect was en-
gaged in any treasonable or secret machinations against the gov-
ernment. (p. 255) There was no provision for judicial proceed-
ings. 
Three serious constitutional objections can be leveled 
against the Alien Act, none of which is a plain knock-down. 
First, it had an enumerated powers problem. Congress has 
power over foreign commerce and naturalization, but no explicit 
power over non-citizens resident in the country. The 1798 Act, 
however, was not about aliens in general. It was about aliens 
who threatened national security. While there must be some 
limits to Congress' power to protect the country's institutions, or 
the principle of enumeration is meaningless, expelling specific 
individuals who are reasonably believed to threaten the nation is 
quite plausibly necessary and proper to a functioning govern-
ment. Many years later, of course, the Supreme Court was to 
take an even broader view of congressional power here, finding 
that Congress has inherent authority to regulate the admission of 
aliens and their privilege of remaining in the United States.16 
Second, the Act had delegation problems. It gave the 
President wide latitude in deciding which aliens to deport. Nev-
ertheless it was not clearly a transfer of the legislative power to 
the executive. Under the Alien Act the President had to make 
16. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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judgments as to threats to the peace and safety of the United 
States. He was to apply the same criteria in making military 
policy as commander in chief, a preeminently executive function. 
Unless one wants to say that the Commander in Chief Clause is 
actually an exception to the separation of legislative and execu-
tive power the way the Veto Clause is, one can readily charac-
terize the decisions called for under the Alien Act as executive. 
Finally, the Act provided for removal without judicial pro-
ceedings. Once again, that was not plainly unconstitutional. For 
one thing, because the Act did not suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, any alien taken into custody by the executive would have 
been able to obtain a judicial decision concerning the order of 
detention. The extent to which the executive's decision would 
have been treated as conclusive is not clear from the statute. In 
any event, it was quite plausible to say, as at least one Federalist 
did, that for aliens residence in the United States was a privilege 
and not a right, so that full judicial process was not required be-
fore it could be taken away. 7 (p. 257) 
Thus even the Alien Act was not an obvious violation of the 
Constitution. It was, one can infer from Currie, the diciest stat-
ute Congress passed during the period he studied. Nothing else 
was that close to the line. 
Now for the second objection. Suppose that none of the 
early Congresses did anything plainly unconstitutional. One 
might think that fact irrelevant on the ground that they were not 
seriously tempted to. There is some force to this point, and once 
again I say only that the behavior of the first six Congresses gives 
us some reason to believe that Congress is unlikely to act in a 
way plainly contrary to the Constitution. Still, the 1790s pre-
sented some real temptations to take some blatantly unconstitu-
tional step, all of which were resisted. 
As should not surprise us, the events surrounding the Sedi-
tion Act provide a leading example. The Federalists in Congress 
did not try to attaint anyone, even though they easily enough 
could have made up an enemies list. If the Anti-Federalists had 
really meant all that they said during the ratification debates 
concerning the tyrannical tendencies of the new central govern-
ment, they should have been astonished by their opponents' 
moderation. The government was on the verge of war with 
17. As Currie notes, (p. 257) the Supreme Court has from time to time employed 
the rights-privilege distinction in finding that Congress has substantial power over the 
procedures through which aliens are kept out of the country or removed from it. 
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France and faced, many of its leaders believed, a disloyal opposi-
tion that was in the French pocket. That is the kind of situation 
that brings out the worst in rulers, but the worst it brought out of 
Congress was still arguably within the Constitution. 
According to the third major objection, Congress was kept 
in check by a widely shared expectation that there would be ju-
dicial review. That there was such an expectation Currie docu-
ments. (p. 120) But so what? Judicial review is just another 
constitutional rule, like the ban on bills of attainder. Indeed, it is 
famously less clear that the Constitution provides for judicial re-
view than that it bans, for example, unapportioned direct taxes. 18 
A Congress that would attaint someone would have no scruple 
about getting the judges out of the way if it could. And if the 
President, the army, and ultimately the people were prepared to 
go along with an attainder, which is blatantly unconstitutional, it 
is hard to imagine why they would care if the courts reminded 
them of that fact. If you can swallow attainder you can swallow 
no judicial review. American political leaders who can defy the 
Constitution can defy the courts, which take their authority from 
the document and not the other way around.19 
Finally, there may be a problem with putting too much 
stock in this particular piece of evidence. Currie covers a period 
in which the Constitution of 1787 with its first ten amendments 
reflected living political realities, consensus on some issues and 
deals on others like the States' equal suffrage in the Senate. 
Maybe Congress avoided doing anything openly unconstitutional 
because of the underlying politics, not because of the independ-
ent principle that the Constitution is the law. 
There is something to this point, but its importance should 
not be overstated. While every provision in the Constitution 
does not today represent a real consensus or a real settlement, 
18. Article I, Section 9, paragraph 4 forbids unapportioned direct taxes, but there is 
no judicial review clause. 
19. It is worth remembering that this point about Congress, whatever its force, is 
not an argument against the entire institution that we know as judicial review. It is not 
an argument against the judicial role that the Supremacy Clause primarily identifies, that 
of refusing to enforce unconstitutional state actions. State governments may well be 
much more likely to pass plainly unconstitutional legislation than is Congress, and one 
might think the courts better than the States at resolving nice questions. Nor is this an 
argument against judicial enforcement of constitutional rules that apply directly to the 
executive branch. What Congress does tells us little about what the Collector of the Port 
of New York is likely to do, or about the extent to which the President is likely to keep 
track of the Collector. But insofar as we are concerned about the straight·up Marbury 
question, Currie's book gives us some reason not to worry that Congress will decide to 
give each State three Senators. 
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the principle that the Constitution is law very likely represents 
the latter and quite possibly the former. So while we should not 
abruptly generalize from the early days, we also should not sim-
ply throw the information away. Government always rests on 
consensus and settlement. 
III. FAME AND THE FOUNDERS' STUDENTS 
Currie is a fan as well as a fair commentator, clearly re-
garding the people of the Federalist period as his fellow Ameri-
cans. In this story that begins with the First Congress, his hero 
appears to be the First President, "the indispensable focal point, 
the glue that held the uncertain enterprise together." (p. 297) 
Currie here emulates Representative John Marshall of Virginia, 
who on the great man's death submitted to the House a resolu-
tion "dubbing him (really!) 'first in war, first in peace, and first in 
the hearts of his countrymen."' (p. 275 n.313) Shortly thereafter 
Congress adopted legislation that provided for appropriate 
ceremonies, recommended commemorations to the citizenry, 
and called for a monument to be erected. (Id.) 
Currie has some fun at this point by keeping his eye on the 
constitutional-law ball: "It seems churlish to question any of this, 
but that is what this book is about. A resolution passed by the 
same Congress to provide a medal to the Captain of the 'Con-
stellation' suggests that recognition for services rendered may be 
necessary and proper to the functioning of public offices (not 
least, to attract qualified persons and encourage their best ef-
forts). In any event, the monument was to be erected in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, over which Congress had the power of 'exclu-
sive legislation."' (I d.) 
The first proposed rationale, however it might work today, 
was in that context a good means-end story under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. According to Douglas Adair, "the lust for 
the psychic reward of fame, honor, glory, after 1776 becomes the 
key ingredient in the behavior of Washington and his greatest 
contemporaries."20 Hamilton seems to have thought much of the 
love of fame, which he called "the ruling passion of the noblest 
minds."21 
20. Douglas Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers 8 (Norton, 1974). 
21. Federalist 72 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 488 (Wesleyan 
U. Press, 1961). 
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David Currie's work, here and elsewhere, might lead us to 
question Publius. If Currie is an indication, the ruling passion of 
the noblest minds might be the pleasure of finding things out.22 
Or maybe the two can go together. Thucydides wanted to get at 
the truth so that he could make something that would be a pos-
session for all time; he apparently hoped that his by-line would 
survive with it. There are worse things to be famous for. 
22. I borrow that phrase from Richard Feynman. 
